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This paper examines how contingent factors relevant to the viability of wholly owned foreign 
subsidiary operations affect the management control system exercised by multinational 
corporation headquarters. We focus on two sets of contingent factors: first, strategic factors 
relating to corporate and competitive strategy; and second, integration factors relating to 
integration internal and external to a multinational corporation. We apply a control archetype 
approach to more comprehensively consider control exercised, relative to extant literature. 
Our evidence is based on data from a cross-sectional survey completed by 159 multinational 
corporation headquarters. Our findings indicate activity sharing corporate strategies, low cost 
competitive strategies, and higher internal integration, affect greater degrees of control. 
Differentiation based competitive strategies and external integration appear to have less 
substantial and narrower implications on the degree of control exercised. These findings are 
robust to sensitivity testing and are consistent with our expectations that headquarters 
exercise a higher degree of control in contexts perceived as less problematic. 
 








The objective of this study is to examine the implications of contingent factors, important for 
wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) viability, on the management control system 
(MCS) exercised by multinational corporation (MNC) headquarters. In particular, we focus 
on two sets of contingent factors important for WOFS viability: first, the strategic factors 
relating to the scope of business involvement (corporate strategy) and the means of achieving 
a competitive advantage in the market (competitive strategy). Second, the degree of 
integration1 both within an MNC (corporate embeddedness) and external to an MNC 
(external embeddedness). These factors, exhibiting significant heterogeneity across different 
firms, are important in relation to competitiveness and resource access (Forsgren, Pedersen, 
& Foss, 1999; Goold, Campbell, & Alexander, 1994; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Tallman & 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). We apply a control archetype2 approach to consider the degree of 
control exercised by headquarters, providing the basis of a more comprehensive 
understanding of control in this context. 
Our motivation for this study is based on the continued importance of WOFS operations for 
MNCs emphasised in recent times. The importance of WOFS operations has been reaffirmed 
in many cases due to the challenging conditions MNCs face in home markets, for instance in 
parts of Europe and North America (Vachani, 2005). These operations provide a means of 
diversifying the geographic scope and market dependence of MNCs, while maintaining 
wholly owned control. Further, there has been a growth in emerging country based 
multinational corporations which now have a substantial presence in the global economy 
(Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007; Dunning, 2006; Luo & Tang, 2007). 
                                                 
1 We focus on the concept of embeddedness given it is more defined from a conceptual and methodological 
perspective, compared with the concept of interdependence which is more broadly defined and examined in the 
literature. 
2 A control archetype is defined a set of control mechanisms exercised together (Speklé, 2001).  
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The opportunities associated with WOFS operations also present challenges for MNC 
headquarters. Many operations are exposed to somewhat volatile and unpredictable 
environments at a distance from headquarters (Cuypers & Martin, 2010; Shroff, Verdi, & Yu, 
2014; White, Hemphill, Joplin, & Marsh, 2014). The importance of WOFS strategic and 
integration considerations for the viability of these operations is well articulated in 
management literature and appears no less important than ever (Forsgren, et al., 1999; Goold, 
et al., 1994; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). Understanding 
the implications of these factors on headquarters’ management control system is important in 
the interests of WOFS competitiveness and resource access. 
Our evidence is based on a survey of Australian MNC headquarters controlling WOFS 
operations for which we received 159 usable responses. We find that activity sharing 
corporate strategies, low cost competitive strategies, and high corporate embeddedness, are 
associated with high degrees of control exercised (based on the control archetypes). This is 
consistent with the less problematic nature of controlling WOFS operations in the context of 
these factors, along with headquarters’ desire to more tightly control operations at a distance 
where possible (Giacobbe, Matolcsy, & Wakefield, 2016). Differentiation based competitive 
strategies and external embeddedness have less substantial and narrower effects on the degree 
of control exercised. These effects can be linked to the more problematic nature of 
controlling WOFS operations exhibiting these factors, based on the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) theoretical approach that we apply in this study. 
Through applying a control archetype approach to considering the degree of control 
exercised, this study contributes to existing literature by addressing concerns associated with 
fragmentary consideration of control (Berry, Coad, Harris, Otley, & Stringer, 2009). 
Literature concerning the implications of contingent factors we examine, particularly relating 
to integration, on more comprehensive conceptualisations of control is limited; this is 
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surprising given the economic significance of WOFS operations. We build on the findings of 
prior literature concerning control of WOFS operations (Giacobbe, et al., 2016), develop a 
deeper understanding of contingent factor implications on control choices, and contribute to 
the substantial body of contingency research in literature (Ashton, et al., 2009). In addition, 
given the relevance of contingent factors to practice, our study alleviates research-practice 
gap translation issues (Tucker & Lowe, 2014). 
In this paper we first present the literature review and theory development, where the 
hypotheses are presented. Next we describe the research method, followed by the results and 
associated discussion. We then present sensitivity testing and additional modelling before we 
conclude and suggest opportunities for future research. 
2. Literature review and theory development 
A review of the literature indicates the study of WOFS operations and related control, in this 
distinct context, is limited. Many studies generally group a range of entities into the general 
category of foreign subsidiaries for the purpose of analysis, ranging from joint ventures to 
WOFS operations (Jaussaud & Schaaper, 2006). This is problematic because there are 
notable differences concerning the organisational dynamics and control associated with 
partially and fully owned entities (Giacobbe & Booth, 2009; Talay & Cavusgil, 2008). 
Accordingly, the generalisability of findings to the WOFS specific entity type may be limited 
(Abernethy, Bouwens, & Lent, 2004; Chenhall, 2003; Langfield-Smith, 1997). We 
specifically examine control of WOFS operations, addressing this problematic issue. 
Many factors are relevant to the degree of control exercised by MNCs over WOFS 
operations, consistent with the domain of contingency theory (Chenhall, 2003). We identify 
several factors important for the viability of WOFS operations which we predict shape the 
control headquarters’ exercise across the two categories of strategic factors and subsidiary 
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integration. According to the suggestions of literature, these factors relate to subsidiary 
viability when controlled from a distance particularly when facing challenges presented by 
intensive market competitiveness and developmental processes associated with establishing 
and/or operating a subsidiary in a foreign market (Agbejule, 2005; Hoque, 2005; 
Muralidharan & Hamilton, 1999). The acquisition and possession of knowledge and other 
resources these factors facilitate is central to the subsidiary viability (Forsgren, et al., 1999; 
Goold, et al., 1994; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002).  
We apply a TCE theory approach to this study as it provides a parsimonious perspective to 
consider the implications of contingent factors on control exercised; this addresses concerns 
regarding diverse and fragmented approaches noted in literature (Christensen & Kent, 2015; 
Spicer & Ballew, 1983; Williamson, 1979, 2008). In particular, we theorise the links between 
our contingent factors and control exercised through considering TCE activity traits 
(uncertainty, asset specificity and ex-post information asymmetry). Different combinations of 
activity traits and related human traits (bounded rationality and opportunism), driven by 
contingent factors, are argued to be associated with distinct control problems, addressed 
through the control exercised (Kruis, 2008; Speklé, 2001). Central to the contingent factors 
we examine is the importance they have from the perspective of knowledge and other 
viability related resources. Such resources are at distance, from headquarters, and associated 
factor variation is expected to drive uncertainty, asset specificity and ex-post information 
asymmetry. The expected implications of each contingent factor on control exercised is 
explained in the hypotheses development, later in this section. 
The control archetype approach we apply in this study, based on Speklé’s (2001) TCE theory 
of management control, provides notable opportunities to develop a more comprehensive and 
holistic understanding of control, beyond the examination of single control mechanisms in 
much of literature (Shields, 2015). There are a range of alternative control frameworks in 
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literature; however, the consideration of different sets of control mechanisms applied together 
is very limited (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012; Simons, 1994), 
particularly in the context of the factors we consider, notably strategy (Tucker, Thorne, & 
Gurd, 2009; Tucker & Parker, 2015). Speklé (2001) conceptualises a series of control 
archetypes which are argued to be exercised in association with variation in the activity traits 
(based on TCE theory). These control archetypes, described in the context of headquarters 
controlling WOFS operations, are as follows: 
 Arm’s length control: High relative autonomy provided to subsidiary management, 
with headquarter invention if performance is unsatisfactory. Market based 
benchmarks applied for the purpose of targets, monitoring, evaluation and rewards.  
 Results oriented machine control: High relative autonomy provided to subsidiary 
management within a framework of internally developed performance targets, 
providing the basis of monitoring, evaluation and rewards. 
 Action oriented machine control: Low relative autonomy provided to subsidiary 
management within a framework of clearly defined tasks, standardised behaviour 
and limited scope for discretionary behaviour. Close monitoring of norms and 
standards. 
 Exploratory control: High relative autonomy provided to subsidiary management 
and performance targets established as information emerges, which form the basis of 
monitoring and subjective evaluation of subsidiary management. Rewards based on 
long-term performance. 
 Boundary control: High relative autonomy within clearly specified behavioural 
boundaries, including decision-making authority, which headquarters monitors 
closely and takes action if there are breaches. 
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From an empirical perspective, Giacobbe et al. (2016) is one of the few studies examining the 
validity of this control archetype approach and provides support that these archetypes are 
valid representations of different sets of control mechanisms exercised. They find that these 
distinct control archetypes are observed, however, they are used in combination rather than 
exclusively, as suggested by Speklé (2001). Further, Giacobbe et al. (2016) find that 
generally, more problematic control contexts, as measured by activity traits in TCE theory, 
are associated with control archetypes being exercised to a lower degree. In particular, higher 
levels of uncertainty, asset specificity and ex-post information asymmetry, from the 
headquarters’ perspective, are associated with the five control archetypes being exercised to a 
lower degree, to varying extents. These findings provide the basis of our theoretical and 
hypotheses development that follows below, allowing us to consider the implications of the 
contingent factors we examine on control exercised. Specifically, we consider the 
implications of contingent factors on the overall degree of control exercised by headquarters, 
given headquarters appear to exercise control archetypes in combination together (Giacobbe, 
et al., 2016). 
2.1 Corporate strategy (headquarters level) 
In this study corporate strategy is defined as the investment approach of headquarters 
concerning the variation in business involvement. The scope of corporate strategy ranges 
from activity sharing (one line of business) to portfolio management (multiple and diversified 
businesses) (Goold, Campbell, & Luchs, 1993; Porter, 1987). While synergies between 
organisational units (including subsidiaries) may be associated with corporate strategy, 
synergies are captured and analysed as a separate variable (corporate embeddedness) in this 
study.  
Headquarters’ engagement in related businesses under an activity sharing strategy increases 
its ability to process ex-ante information widely applicable to subsidiaries, minimising 
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uncertainty faced by headquarters controlling a number of WOFS operations (Chandler, 
1962; Goold & Luchs, 2003; Nilsson, 2002). Bounded rationality becomes more problematic 
with the movement from activity sharing to portfolio management strategies, where 
headquarters are less familiar with operations and process relatively low amounts of 
information about unrelated businesses (Argyres, 1995; Nilsson, 2002). Accordingly, 
headquarters are likely to be less effective at defining comprehensive processes or 
expectations for portfolio management, compared with activity sharing corporate strategies. 
The implications of corporate strategy on asset specificity are less clear. The relatively 
narrow scope of business involvement under an activity sharing strategy may lead to the 
development of corporation specific routines, management skills and practices. This may 
allow resources from the WOFS to be diverted to other areas of the MNC if necessary 
(Anand & Singh, 1997; Williamson, 1975). However, whether or not this is practical in the 
context of the WOFS operations controlled at a distance from other divisions is questionable. 
Resources in WOFS operations controlled under a portfolio management strategy may be 
more tailored to the unique and specific nature of each operation. This may mean that it is 
problematic to redirect these resources. 
Similar to ex-ante information, ex-post information asymmetry is expected to be lower under 
an activity sharing strategy compared with a portfolio management strategy, consistent with 
the similarity of business involvement in the corporation. The narrow scope of business area 
involvement under an activity sharing strategy enhances headquarters’ ability to identify and 
assess key performance indicators concerning subsidiary performance (Park, 2002). In 
contrast, under a portfolio management strategy the diversity of different businesses 
minimises headquarters’ ability to identify key performance indicators, particularly non-
financial indicators, and identify desired performance outcomes (Park, 2002). 
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According to TCE characteristics, headquarters appear to face a more problematic context 
when exercising control under a portfolio management approach to corporate strategy due to 
relatively higher uncertainty, possibly higher asset specificity, and higher ex-post information 
asymmetry concerning WOFS operations. A higher degree of control overall (based on the 
five control archetypes) is likely to be suboptimal due to headquarters’ bounded rationality 
concerning control exercised, and subsidiary personnel opportunism through manipulating 
various performance metrics and information flows. In contrast, under an activity sharing 
strategy, greater ex-ante and ex-post information concerning WOFS operations and possibly 
lower levels of asset specificity means headquarters are in a better position to exercise a 
higher degree of control. Based on prior literature, we expect headquarters to exercise a lower 
degree of control (through the five control archetypes) in the context of a portfolio 
management, relative to activity sharing, corporate strategy given it is a less problematic 
context. Therefore, we propose:  
H1: A portfolio management strategy, relative to activity sharing, is associated with a 
lower degree of control. 
2.2 Competitive strategy (WOFS level) 
Competitive strategy refers to the means by which a subsidiary competes and achieves a 
competitive advantage in the market it operates (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Controls exercised 
by headquarters should be consistent with the autonomy needed by subsidiary management to 
operationalise, monitor and modify competitive strategy to realise the benefits of competitive 
strategy (Kober, Ng, & Paul, 2007; Simons, 1994). While there is generally substantial 
literature regarding the association between control and competitive strategy (Chenhall, 
2003), examination in the context of WOFS operations, where headquarters is at a distance is 
limited. In addition, there is limited literature dealing more comprehensive considerations of 
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control. Accordingly, we examine competitive strategy effects, particularly given the 
importance associated with subsidiary viability.  
Low cost competitive strategies are characterised by the drive for production efficiencies and 
operational continuity as organisations seek to maintain competitiveness in markets with high 
product homogeneity (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998; Miles & Snow, 1978). Consistent 
with the importance of efficiency, there is greater continuity of operations suggesting 
headquarters have greater ex-ante information regarding WOFS operations, lowering 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2005). Ex-post information asymmetry is also 
expected to be lower, again consistent with continuity of operations, suggesting headquarters 
establish and consistently monitor key performance indicators (Birkinshaw, Toulan, & 
Arnold, 2001; Dunning, 1993; Kruis, 2008). 
The specificity of assets in the context of low cost competitive strategies is generally 
expected to be lower (Williamson, 1975). This is consistent with the wider marketability of 
products produced for a range of customers where there is limited variation in preferences. 
Accordingly, the ability to redeploy assets to serve alternative customers is high. 
The combination of the low uncertainty, ex-post information asymmetry and asset specificity, 
and accordingly a less problematic context, suggests headquarters are in a position to exercise 
a higher degree of control through the five control archetypes. This is consistent with the 
lower likelihood of both headquarters being exposed to bounded rationality concerning 
control exercised and the opportunistic motives of subsidiary personnel reducing the 
effectiveness of control exercised. Accordingly, we propose:  
H2:  Low cost competitive strategies are associated with a higher degree of control. 
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Competitive strategies based on differentiation generally relate to taking advantage of new 
market opportunities through the development of new products and/or markets (Miles & 
Snow, 1978). The continuity of subsidiary operations is therefore lower, relatively, and 
subsidiary personnel are required to be more dynamic to take advantage of emerging 
opportunities. Consistent with the dynamic nature of operations in this situation, headquarters 
are expected to have relatively limited ex-ante knowledge regarding WOFS processes and 
activities, causing higher uncertainty (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2005). Further, the 
greater variation in subsidiary operations to exploit new market opportunities suggests 
headquarters’ ability to monitor the performance outcomes of subsidiary operations is limited 
and accordingly ex-post information asymmetry is high (Birkinshaw, et al., 2001; Dunning, 
1993; Kruis, 2008).  
Resources under differentiation competitive strategies are specifically tailored and evolve 
according to opportunities emerging in the market place. Accordingly, assets are specific to 
products produced and sold – possibly for a niche market. The ability to redeploy assets to 
serve alternative customers is expected to be relatively limited (Williamson, 1975). 
Based on the indications of literature, the presence of a differentiation competitive strategy is 
expected to be associated with higher uncertainty, ex-post information asymmetry and asset 
specificity, and therefore a more problematic context to control. This presents challenges 
from the perspective of headquarters concerning bounded rationality when choosing control 
and the effectiveness of such control is questionable due to opportunistic WOFS personal 
motives. Therefore, we propose:  
H3:  Differentiation competitive strategies are associated with a lower degree of control. 
According to the literature, low cost and differentiation competitive strategies are not 
mutually exclusive choices, but are blended together and jointly exercised (Adler, 2011; 
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Murray, 1988). For this reason, separate hypotheses are needed concerning the effects of 
different competitive strategies on control exercised.  
2.3 Corporate embeddedness (WOFS level) 
Corporate embeddedness refers to subsidiary adaptation to entities within a MNC, associated 
with synergies between entities facilitating resource sharing (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996). 
We consider the implications of both tangible and intangible resource flows associated with 
corporate embeddedness, more comprehensively than prior literature which considers 
tangible resource flows only (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984; 
Thompson, 1967). Intangible resource flows are an important aspect of corporate 
embeddedness, particularly for knowledge intensive firms (Ditillo, 2004). For the purpose of 
our study corporate embeddedness and corporate strategy are distinct concepts, referring to 
corporate integration and investment approaches respectively (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; 
Goold, et al., 1993; Porter, 1987). 
The potential for cross business unit synergies to be realised, maintained and enhanced where 
corporate embeddedness is high means headquarters are incentivised to acquire information 
concerning subsidiary operations, reducing the level of uncertainty (Chandler, 1991). This 
contrasts with low subsidiary corporate embeddedness, where the incentive and ability of 
headquarters to acquire information is limited (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984; Freeland, 1996; Gupta 
& Govindarajan, 1991; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Williamson, 1975). Accordingly, 
greater information concerning subsidiary operations where corporate embeddedness is high 
increases the ability of headquarters to specify processes and ex-ante expectations at the 
subsidiary level (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2005). 
Again, similar to the possible effects of corporate strategy, the implications of corporate 
embeddedness on asset specificity are less clear. Following the definition of corporate 
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embeddedness suggests assets are specifically adapted to resource flows between entities 
(Andersson & Forsgren, 1996). Accordingly, this facilitates the movement of resources from 
one subsidiary to another, reducing asset specificity from a corporate perspective. However, 
the ability to divest subsidiary resources from the MNC may be limited given the corporate 
embeddedness between different entities. Such divestment may have wider reaching 
implications for the MNC as a whole and expose the corporation to significant risk of large 
opportunity losses (Collis & Montgomery, 1997; Freeland, 1996; Williamson, 1975). The 
effects of corporate embeddedness on asset specificity appear therefore to depend on whether 
the resources can be reallocated internally or externally from the MNC.  
The degree to which a subsidiary is adapted to other entities across the MNC determines how 
interrelated its performance is with these entities (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996). High 
corporate embeddedness levels are likely to be associated with common benchmarks, 
allowing relative performance assessment, consistent with high adaptation between WOFS 
operations. This suggests corporate embeddedness decreases the ex-post information 
asymmetry headquarters face. 
Based on TCE characteristics, headquarters appear to face a less problematic context where 
corporate embeddedness is high. Bounded rationality concerning headquarters’ control 
choices and opportunistic subsidiary personal behaviour, through manipulation of metrics and 
information associated with control, is likely to be minimal under high corporate 
embeddedness. Consistent with these suggestions, we propose:  
H4: Corporate embeddedness is associated with a higher degree of control. 
2.4 External embeddedness (WOFS level) 
External embeddedness refers to the adaptation of a subsidiary to entities within the business 
context in which it is located, including customers, suppliers, distributors, government 
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organisations and professional trade associations (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). High 
external embeddedness generally enhances the ability of subsidiary management to acquire 
knowledge of the market (Hansen, 1999; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Integration and adaptation 
is a constant process in order to maintain or enhance market competitiveness (Abdel-Kader & 
Luther, 2008; Andersson, Bjorkman, & Forsgren, 2005). 
Given the constant evolution of WOFS operations which are highly externally embedded, it is 
expected that headquarters finds it challenging to acquire and process relevant information 
from a distance (Ghoshal, Korine, & Szulanski, 1994; Hansen, 2002; Schulz, 2001). 
Accordingly, headquarters have limited ex-ante information relating to factors including 
government regulations, market trends and customer preferences (Birkinshaw, et al., 2001; 
Dunning, 1993). This suggests the external embeddedness is associated with higher 
uncertainty concerning subsidiary operations (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2005).. 
A wider group of interested parties is expected to value WOFS external embeddedness, 
particularly if these parties have associations with subsidiary operations (for example, 
suppliers and customers). Accordingly, the opportunity for headquarters to divest highly 
externally embedded WOFS operations is expected to be greater, reducing asset specificity 
and opportunity costs.  
The evolution of a highly externally embedded WOFS over time, as it adapts to the local 
context, suggests that performance assessment and evaluation need to be continually adapted. 
Headquarters’ ability to use the most relevant measures to accurately capture performance in 
situations of high external embeddedness may be difficult, particularly given foreign market 
ambiguity (Tihanyi & Thomas, 2005; Ungson, Braunstein, & Hall, 1981). Accordingly, 
external embeddedness appears to drive higher ex-post information asymmetry from 
headquarters’ perspective (Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 2005). 
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Headquarters appear to find the context of high external embeddedness more problematic 
from a control perspective. While asset specificity may be lower, uncertainty and ex-post 
information asymmetry are higher. Accordingly, bounded rationality concerning 
headquarters’ control exercised, and issues associated opportunistic motives of WOFS 
personnel, are more likely. We therefore propose: 
H5: External embeddedness is associated with a lower degree of control. 
3. Research method 
We conducted a cross sectional survey questionnaire following Dillman (2000). The survey 
instrument is provided in Appendix A. The survey was sent to senior managers at MNC 
headquarters who were involved in the control of WOFS operations. We received 178 
responses (a response rate of 28.8%). Nine responses were removed from the sample due to 
incomplete survey completion and ten were removed as they related to dormant subsidiaries, 
zero employee subsidiaries, leaving 159 firm responses for the purpose of our analysis. 
Survey respondents indicated they had been working at their company for an average of 9.58 
years and currently held senior positions, as described in Table 1 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
There was a large variation in respondent characteristics, with MNCs employing between 5–
38,000 people, while their focal WOFS employed between 1–5,000 people. We include a size 
control variable in our regression models to take this variation into account. As shown in 
Table 2 below, respondent firms are involved in diverse industries (Panel A) and subsidiary 
locations (Panel B), generally reflective of multinational firm involvement.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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To address concerns regarding non-response bias, we compared the variable means of early 
and late responses. The means of the constructs for early and late respondents are not 
significantly different according to the t-statisitcs, with the exception of external 
embeddedness. However, given the difference in the early and late respondent means for 
external embeddedness is small (0.297 difference on the 5 point Likert scale), and all other 
differences are statistically insignificant, non-response bias is not a concern in this study. In 
addition, we also examined whether common method bias was a concern through Harman’s 
single-factor test. Based on all 31 indicators applied to measure the construct variables in this 
study (detailed below), Harman’s single factor test results in nine factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one, with the strongest factor explaining 20.9% of the total variance. This 
suggests common method bias is not a concern in this study (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
3.1 Variable measurement 
In order to measure the management control system (MCS) and contingent factors and 
(constructs), the relevant indicators3 are combined though simple additive aggregation (after 
relevant validity testing).  
3.1.1 Control measurement 
We measure control through two stages. First, we measure Speklé’s (2001) individual control 
archetype conceptualisations by adapting indicators and associated survey questions from 
Kruis (2008) and applying them to the WOFS operations context. The control archetype 
indicators and associated survey questions are summarised in Table B.1 (Appendix B). The 
validity of these control archetypes are examined by Giacobbe et al. (2016) whose findings 
indicate these archetypes are representative of distinct control choices. However, they also 
find these control choices are not exercised independently as Speklé (2001) suggests; 
                                                 
3 Indicator measurement scales are reversed where appropriate to ensure that higher construct value convey 
higher degrees of the relevant phenomenon. 
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accordingly we measure the degree each independent control archetype is exercised. To 
determine the construct values for each control archetype, the relevant indicators, as shown in 
Table B.1, are factor analysed and aggregated. 
In the second stage, we aggregate the five control archetype constructs to create a second 
order construct measuring the overall degree of control exercised by headquarters. This 
construct will initially be applied as the dependent variable in the regression models to test 
the hypotheses. This construct is regarded as a second order formative construct given the 
distinct nature of each control archetype aggregated. While headquarters are expected to use 
combinations of control archetypes to affect a certain degree of control, each archetype is 
unique and relates to distinct control mechanisms and therefore is not expected to be a 
reflective underlying construct. 
3.1.2 MNC corporate strategy 
The MNC corporate strategy is captured through indicators from Rumelt (1974) which relate 
to the specialisation and related ratio; this measures the revenues attributable to the core area 
of business and the extent of involvement in one product area respectively (survey question 
11a-c). These ratios are measured according to perceptual Likert scales in this study, given 
ratio based data is difficult to reliably gather through a survey instrument. 
3.1.3 Competitive strategy 
Competitive strategy is a multifaceted variable and accordingly a series of different indicators 
are applied to measure it in this study (Dess & Davis, 1984; Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
Specifically, we apply two sets of indicators to measure competitive strategy, the first set 
focuses on low cost competitive strategies and is based on the extent operating efficiency, 
competitive pricing, procurement of product inputs, reducing production costs, and 
minimisation of outside financing are important for competitiveness (survey question 12a-e). 
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The second set of indicators focuses on differentiation competitive strategies and is based on 
the importance of new product development, brand identification, innovative marketing 
techniques, control of distribution channels, and advertising for competitiveness (survey 
question 12f-j). 
3.1.4 Corporate embeddedness 
Guidance from prior studies on how to measure corporate embeddedness is limited beyond 
the suggestions of Andersson and Forsgren (1996). Given embeddedness is defined by the 
degree of adaptation to other entities (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2001, 2007), it is 
appropriate to capture the extent a foreign subsidiary adapts operations to other entities 
within an MNC to measure corporate embeddedness (survey question 13e). 
3.1.5 External embeddedness 
Since external embeddedness relates to subsidiary adaptation to stakeholders in the context it 
operates, Dimiratos, Liouka and Young (2009) argue it is important to consider customers, 
suppliers, distributors, government organisations and professional trade associations when 
measuring this variable. Based on Andersson, Forsgren and Holm (2002), external 
embeddedness is measured by the extent a subsidiary adapts the way it conducts business 
with stakeholders (survey question 13a-d). 
3.1.6 Variable measurement validity 
To confirm the validity of the constructs4 and associated indicators we first examine the 
rotated factors loadings. Indicators with factors loadings less than 0.5 (acceptable threshold) 
are removed from the factor analysis and construct measurement (Jarvis, Mackenzie, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). The final factor loadings are reported in Table C.1 (Appendix C) with the 
                                                 
4 Corporate embeddedness is measured on the basis of one indicator, consistent with existing literature. The 
validity testing conducted is appropriate for constructs measured with two or more indicators and therefore 
corporate embeddedness is not included in this validity testing section. Given the measurement validity of the 
other constructs in this study, we have no reason to believe the single indicator measurement is problematic.  
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indicators remaining closely aligned with the unique and underlying characteristics of each 
construct, consistent with the reflective nature of construct indicators. Second, we examine 
the internal consistency of the construct indicators through Cronbach’s alpha. All alphas are 
close to or higher than 0.70, as reported in Table C.2 (Appendix C), indicating acceptable 
composite reliability.5 Finally, we examine the discriminant validity of the constructs by 
comparing the square root of the average variance extracted to construct correlations (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981), reported in Table C.3 (Appendix C). The value of the square root of AVE 
is higher than the correlations in all cases, indicating acceptable discriminant validity, with 
the exception of action-oriented machine and boundary control. This indicates it may be 
problematic to discriminate between action-oriented machine and boundary control, 
consistent with the direct nature of these control archetypes. However, all other control 
archetypes appear discriminately valid, consistent with the formative nature of the second 
order degree of control construct. The descriptive statistics of the variables explained in this 
section are provided below in Table 3. The descriptive statistics have sufficient variation for 
the purpose of the regression analysis. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
3.2 Regression modelling 
Consistent with our measurement of control, we analyse the effects of contingent factors in 
two ways using ordinary least square (OLS) regression modelling. First, we analyse the effect 
of contingent factors on the overall degree of control exercised (second order construct), 
providing a direct test of our hypotheses. Second, we analyse the effect of contingent factors 
on each of the five control archetype variables, providing a more detailed analysis relating to 
                                                 
5 For the purposes of consistency, we report the rotated factor loadings and internal consistency for the degree of 
control. As expected, given the formative nature of this second order construct, rotated factor loadings and 
internal consistency are lower. 
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the contingent factor effects on more distinct mechanisms of control. The regression models 
are represented by the following (Model 1): 
(1)  CONTROLi = α0 + α1CORP_STRATEGYi + α2LOWCOST_STRATEGYi + 
α3DIFF_STRATEGYi + α4CORP_EMBEDi + α5EXT_EMBEDi + α6SIZEi + εi  
where: 
CONTROL: Based on the explanation above (Section 3.1.1), the following control 
variables are applied in our regression models: 
DEGREE_CONTROL: measures the degree of control exercised based on 
aggregating the five control archetypes, with high values indicating a high degree 
of control exercised. 
CONTROL_ARCHETYPE: measures the degree each individual control archetype 
is exercised by headquarters, through continuous variables, with high values 
representing greater use of each control archetype. One OLS regression is run for 
each of the five control archetypes in order to examine the effects of the contingent 
factors on these control archetypes. 
CORP_STRATEGY: measures the corporate strategy of the MNC. Low values indicate 
an activity sharing strategy, whereas high values indicate a portfolio management 
strategy. 
LOWCOST_STRATEGY: measures the extent to which a subsidiary has a low cost 
competitive strategy. High values indicate the use of a low cost competitive strategy. 
DIFF_STRATEGY: measures the extent to which a subsidiary has a differentiation 
competitive strategy. High values indicate the use of a differentiation competitive 
strategy. 
CORP_EMBED: measures the extent of corporate embeddedness. High values indicate 
high corporate embeddedness. 
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EXT_EMBED: measures the extent of external embeddedness. High values indicate high 
external embeddedness. 
SIZE: size is included as a control variable, based on the number of people employed at a 
MNC, given it is regarded as an important control variable in the literature (Chenhall, 
2003). 
4. Results and discussion  
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 4 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The F-statistic in all regression models is significant at the one percentage level (two-tailed), 
with the adjusted R square values ranging from 8.4% to 26.0%. These R square values are 
more substantial in some cases than the variation explained by TCE activity traits in prior 
studies (Giacobbe, et al., 2016). The variance inflation factors (VIF) are lower than five in all 
cases, indicating multi-collinearity is not a concern (O'Brien, 2007). 
4.1 Corporate strategy 
The coefficient for corporate strategy is negative and significant in the degree of control 
model (coefficient: –0.216, p-value: 0.003), supporting Hypothesis 1. Further, this result is 
consistent in each of the control archetype models, with the exception of arm’s length control. 
These results indicate headquarters exercise a lower degree of control in the presence of a 
portfolio management corporate strategy and a higher degree of control in the presence of an 
activity sharing corporate strategy.  
The lack of a statistically significant coefficient for corporate strategy in the arm’s length 
regression model may be explained by the broader applicability of this control archetype 
regardless of corporate strategy (Sandino, 2007). Situations of activity sharing strategies may 
be associated with readily available market benchmarks from the perspective of headquarters. 
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The use of portfolio management strategies may be associated with the need for external 
market benchmarks in the absence of suitable internal benchmarking. Accordingly, while we 
are not arguing that use of the arm’s length control in all corporate strategy situations is 
appropriate, the importance headquarters place on this control archetype is similar.  
4.2 Competitive strategy 
4.2.1 Low cost competitive strategy 
The coefficient for low cost competitive strategy is positive and statistically significant in the 
degree of control model (coefficient: 0.268, p-value: 0.000), supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Further, this result is consistent in each of the control archetype models with the exception of 
the results oriented machine control model. These results clearly indicate headquarters 
exercise a higher degree of control where WOFS competitive position is more closely 
associated with a low cost competitive strategy. This indicates low cost competitive strategy 
characteristics have a substantial effect on activity trait levels, consistent with the suggestions 
of the literature (Giacobbe, et al., 2016; Speklé, 2001). The fact that low cost competitive 
strategies have a substantial effect on control choices does not come as a surprise given the 
extensive literature on the topic (Chenhall, 2003). However, our finding, concerning the 
overall degree of control and individual control archetypes exercised, is something that has 
not been alluded to in existing literature to a great extent.  
The broad applicability of results control based performance measurement systems, 
regardless of low cost competitive strategy (Sandino, 2007), explains the lack of significant 
affect in results control model. 
4.2.2 Differentiation competitive strategy 
The coefficient for differentiation competitive strategy is positive and marginally statistically 
significant in the degree of control model (coefficient: 0.138, p-value: 0.057), opposite to 
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predictions and therefore not supporting Hypothesis 3. Further, the coefficient for 
differentiation competitive strategy is only significant and positive for the arm’s length 
regression model (coefficient: 0.284, p-value: 0.000). For the remaining four control 
archetype regression models, the differentiation competitive strategy coefficient is 
insignificant. 
There are a range of facets associated with differentiation competitive strategies relating to 
new product development, brand identification, innovative marketing techniques, control of 
distribution channels, and advertising (Dess & Davis, 1984; Langfield-Smith, 1997), 
consistent with our measurement of this variable. Such diversity means the effect on control 
exercised is difficult to examine. However, it is clear that differentiation competitive strategy 
certainly drives greater use of arm’s length control and a potential explanation for this relates 
to the context of controlling WOFS operations at a distance. There is little doubt in this 
organisational context that high uncertainty and ex-post information asymmetry are likely 
(Birkinshaw, et al., 2001; Williamson, 1979). A market based approach to benchmarking 
performance targets, measurement, evaluation and rewards may be an appropriate means of 
dealing with the high uncertainty and ex-post information asymmetry faced. In this case 
headquarters are not exposed to the potential bounded rationality related pitfalls of internal 
benchmarking or opportunistic motives of WOFS management concerning performance 
evaluation. The positive and significant differentiation competitive strategy coefficient in the 
arm’s length control model is therefore not what we initially expect, but is nonetheless a 
logical finding. 
4.3 Corporate embeddedness 
The coefficient for corporate embeddedness is positive and statistically significant in the 
degree of control model (coefficient: 0.191, p-value: 0.010), supporting Hypothesis 4. This 
indicates corporate embeddedness is associated with a higher degree of control. The 
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corporate embeddedness construct is positive and statistically significant in the results, action 
and boundary control archetype models, but insignificant in the arm’s length and exploratory 
control archetype models.  
Reviewing the definition of corporate embeddedness provides some insight into the reasons 
why this factor is significantly and positively associated with some control archetypes and 
not others. High corporate embeddedness means there are significant synergies between 
entities within the MNC (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996). Based on Speklé’s (2001) 
conceptualisation of results control, it is likely that headquarters are in a far better position to 
exercise this control archetype due to the common performance expectations between entities 
controlled. In addition, the common processes and operational activities throughout a 
corporation where entities are highly corporately embedded is likely to fit closely with the 
possible use of action and boundary control archetypes, again consistent with the 
conceptualisations of Speklé (2001). These associations appear to be clearly driven by the 
lower levels of uncertainty and ex-post information as a result of high corporate 
embeddedness. In contrast, the appropriateness of arm’s length control and exploratory 
control may be driven by other WOFS specific characteristics such as competitive strategy 
and stage of development (Chenhall, 2003). This may explain why no significant corporate 
embeddedness coefficients are observed in the arm’s length and exploratory control models. 
4.4 External embeddedness 
The coefficient for external embeddedness is positive and marginally statistically significant 
in the degree of control model (coefficient: 0.122, p-value: 0.097), counter to predictions and 
therefore not supporting Hypothesis 5. Further, the coefficient for external embeddedness is 
only marginally significant (at the 10% level), and positive for the arm’s length and action 
control regression models.  
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Based on the definition of external embeddedness, highly externally embedded WOFS 
operations are adapted to a great extent to entities within the context they are located 
(Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). This suggests that WOFS performance is very much 
dependent on general conditions all entities and relevant stakeholders face in such a context. 
The use of relative and market based performance assessment in such a context is therefore 
relevant and aligns most closely with Speklé’s (2001) conceptualisation of the arm’s length 
control archetype. The significant effect of external embeddedness concerning action control 
suggests headquarters want to maintain some relatively direct control at a distance, possibly 
to minimise risk exposure from outside the firm. Despite the challenges associated with 
controlling at a distance, particularly the high levels of uncertainty and ex-post information 
asymmetry expected where external embeddedness is high, it still seems headquarters may 
consider the use of arm’s length and action control in this context as appropriate; however, 
the marginal significance of the coefficients needs to be noted. Whether these control 
archetype choices have favourable effects on performance is something that needs to be 
considered. 
Given the external embeddedness variable is insignificant in all regression models, with the 
exception of arm’s length and action control models, it appears other variables and 
characteristics of WOFS operations have a more substantial effect on the control headquarters 
exercise. In particular factors such as low cost competitive strategies and corporate 
embeddedness have far more substantial effects on WOFS operations and consequently 
headquarters’ control choices (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996; Chenhall, 2003). This is not to 
say that external embeddedness is not important to WOFS viability, but it is one of many 




4.5 Summary of Model 1 results 
Our results indicate corporate strategy, low cost competitive strategy and corporate 
embeddedness have substantial and significant effects on the degree of control exercised by 
headquarters. In contrast, differentiation competitive strategy and external embeddedness 
have much narrower and distinct effects on the control exercised; in particular there is greater 
focus on arm’s length control in the presence of these contingent factors associated with more 
problematic contexts (as defined by activity trait levels expected). The focus on arm’s length 
control appears to be associated with the usefulness of market based benchmarks in more 
problematic contexts. 
4.6 Sensitivity testing 
Given the size of our sample, the ability to split the sample for the purpose of sensitivity 
testing is limited. However, we did exclude different segments of our sample and reran the 
regressions to examine the sensitivity of our results. First, we excluded the lowest 10% of 
firms according to size (equivalent to 15 or less employees), then the highest 10% (equivalent 
to 5,000 or more employees). Second, we excluded firms in industries, in turn, that account 
for 10% or more of the sample (manufacturing, mining, professional services and wholesale 
trade). While the composition of firm industry involvement in our sample is consistent with 
industry involvement generally in Australia, these exclusions allowed us to check for industry 
affects. Third, it is widely acknowledged that region can affect choice of MCS (Chenhall, 
2003); therefore we exclude each region, in turn. The three sets of sensitivity tests (based on 
size, industry and location exclusions) are largely consistent with the results for the 
regression models reported in Table 46 and accordingly appear robust.  
                                                 
6 In the interests of conserving the length of this paper, and due to the consistency of results with those reported 




We run the regression models with the inclusion of activity trait independent variables 
(uncertainty, asset specificity, and ex-post information asymmetry), consistent with the 
variables examined in Giacobbe et al. (2016). The implications of the contingent factors we 
examine in this study on control (both the degree of control and individual archetypes) 
remains consistent with the results we report in Table 46, indicating they have important and 
unique effects on control exercised – this relates to the unique combinations of activity traits 
(consistent with TCE theory adopted in this study) and factor specific considerations. This 
reaffirms this study has an important value add beyond existing research. Further, the 
implications of activity traits on control archetypes remain consistent with prior research and 
the VIF statistics indicate multicollinearity is not a concern. 
4.7 Additional testing 
As previously discussed, prior testing of Speklé’s (2001) theory indicates headquarters 
exercise combinations of different control archetypes, affecting different degrees of control; 
this is consistent with dependent variable measurement. However, Speklé’s (2001) original 
theory refers to control choices based on individual and exclusive control archetype choices. 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether the factors analysed in this study drive the 
exclusive selection of these control choices, as an alternative examination, and accordingly 
provide evidence of the appropriateness of the main analysis in this paper. To test whether 
exclusive control archetype selection is determined by the contingent factors, we run the 
following multinominal logistic regression (Model 2): 
(2) CONTROL_ARCHETYPE_MAX i = α0 + α1CORP_STRATEGYi + 
α2LOWCOST_STRATEGYi + α3DIFF_STRATEGYi + α4CORP_EMBEDi + α5EXT_EMBEDi 





CONTROL_ARCHETYPE_MAX: Classifies which of the five control archetypes 
headquarters exercise. The classification is based on which of the five control 
archetypes headquarters exercise to the greatest extent.  
All independent variables are consistent with Model 1. 
The results for the multinominal logistic regressions are presented below in Table 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
While the chi-squares are statistically significant, the percentage of control archetypes 
classified is very low in some cases (4.4% for both arm’s length and action control) and many 
of the independent variable coefficients are insignificant. The results of multinominal logistic 
regression indicate there is very limited evidence headquarters exercise exclusive control 
archetypes, as predicted by Speklé (2001), according to the factors we examine in this study. 
Therefore, these results do not provide any substantial insight into the control exercised by 
headquarters beyond the regression analysis we conduct based on Model 1. 
We also conduct as number of further related tests. We use dummy variable based contingent 
factor variables, based on relative high and low levels, for the purpose of the multinominal 
logistic regression (Model 2) independent variables. We run a binary logistic regression 
(based on Model 2) and replace the dependent variable with a dummy variable measuring 
whether the control archetype is the primary one exercised by headquarters. The results for 
all these further tests indicate the statistical significance of the independent coefficients is 
generally very low.7 Accordingly, the results based on Mode1 1 and presented in Table 4 
                                                 
7 In the interest of conserving the length of this paper, we have not tabled these results, instead tabling the main 
OLS regression results (Table 4) and main alternative set of tests (Table 5). These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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appear to capture the effects of the contingent factors on control exercised to the greatest 
extent. 
5. Conclusion 
We examine the implications of the WOFS viability related contingent factors on the control 
headquarters exercise through a TCE approach. We draw on prior literature given the 
potential of more comprehensive control conceptualisations to assist in better understanding 
control exercised; in particular, Giacobbe et al. (2016) find that Speklé (2001) TCE based 
control conceptualisations are valid representations of headquarters’ control choices, but are 
exercised in combination together. Our investigation is motivated by both the importance of 
WOFS operations and the continuing challenges of such entities from MNC headquarters’ 
perspective (Cuypers & Martin, 2010; Vachani, 2005; White, et al., 2014). 
We find that contingent factors related to subsidiary viability do, to varying extents, affect the 
control headquarters exercise in the context of WOFS operations. Some factors such as 
corporate strategy, low cost competitive strategy and corporate embeddedness, significantly 
affect the overall degree of control exercised; this is consistent with the effect on individual 
control archetypes exercised, largely supporting our hypotheses. This is also consistent with 
prior literature, indicating headquarters exercise a higher degree of control, overall, given the 
context of controlling WOFS operations at a distance (Giacobbe, et al., 2016). However, 
other factors, such as differentiation competitive strategies and external embeddedness, are 
only marginally significantly associated with the overall degree of control exercised, 
consistent with only marginally significant effects on one or two control archetypes exercised 
in each case, in particular arm’s length control. This suggests these factors may have more 
distinct and narrower implications on control choices exercised, in line with the predictions of 
Speklé (2001) original TCE theory of management control.  
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There are a number of limitations and future research opportunities associated with this study. 
First, our study was limited to 159 complete responses. The sensitivity testing we conduct 
indicates our main results are robust; however, future replications, including those where 
headquarters are in different geographical locations, would be beneficial in further 
confirming the robustness of our findings. Second, while the viability related contingent 
factors examined explain a more substantial variation in control exercised than prior studies, 
there is certainly more scope to examine other factors affecting control exercised. Finally, 
extending the implications of this research in terms of the performance implications of 
different control exercised, given the viability related contingent factors, appears an 
important avenue of future research There is significant work to be done in this area and a 
case based approach may be appropriate to first investigate the relevant performance 






Appendix A: Survey instrument 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
 
Purpose of this survey 
The purpose of this survey is to investigate how the head office of Australian companies 
manage wholly (100%) owned foreign subsidiaries. This information will assist in 
understanding the effective management and performance of wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries. 
 
Who is conducting this survey? 
<Removed for blind review> 
 
Instructions 
If your company wholly (100%) owns more than one foreign subsidiary, please choose one 
and answer this questionnaire with respect to this subsidiary. If your company is involved in 
multiple wholly owned foreign subsidiaries and you would like to complete more than one 
questionnaire, please let me know and I will send you additional copies. If you wish to refer 
this questionnaire to someone else in your company, please do so or contact me and I will 
forward the questionnaire to them. If your company does not own foreign subsidiaries, 
please indicate this by ticking the relevant box in the enclosed postcard and return it to us. 
 
Confidentiality 
Your answers to this questionnaire are completely anonymous. To let us know you have 
returned this questionnaire, please return the enclosed postcard separately in the mail so no 
reminder questionnaire is sent to you. 
 
Thank you  
By returning the enclosed postcard with your details we will send you an executive report 
detailing the research findings and other outcomes of this study. 
 
Returning this questionnaire 
Please return this questionnaire in the reply paid envelope within 14 days. 
 
Help available 




 PLEASE START HERE 
 
Answer questions 1 to 4 with respect to your company  
1. How many years have you worked for your company? ______________________years 
2. What is your current position?______________________________________________ 
3. How many people does your company employ: 
a. In Australia:_____________________ 
b. Overseas:_____________________ 
4. Indicate whether your company is involved in: 
  Yes No 
a. International joint ventures  □ □ 
b. Exporting to foreign countries □ □ 
 
The remainder of this survey is about your company’s involvement with 
a wholly (100%) owned foreign subsidiary. Please note in the remainder 
of this survey “head office” refers to the Australian based head office of 
your company.  
5. Please provide the following information about the foreign subsidiary (If your company wholly owns more than 
one foreign subsidiary, answer the questions in this survey with respect to the one of your choice):  
 
a. Location (country): __________________________ 
b. Year of formation: ___________________________ 
c. Number of people employed at subsidiary: ____________________________ 
d. Number of expatriates (personnel from head office) employed at subsidiary: _______________ 
 
6. Please tick the category or categories for the industry in which your company and your foreign subsidiary are 
principally involved (Please tick as many boxes as applicable): 
 
  Your Company Foreign subsidiary 
a. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing □ □ 
b. Mining □ □ 
c. Manufacturing □ □ 
d. Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services □ □ 
e. Construction □ □ 
f. Wholesale Trade □ □ 
g. Retail Trade □ □ 
h. Accommodation and Food Services □ □ 
i. Transport, Postal and Warehousing □ □ 
j. Information Media and Telecommunications □ □ 
k. Finance and Insurance Services □ □ 
l. Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services □ □ 
m. Professional, Scientific and Technical Services □ □ 
n. Administrative and Support Services □ □ 
o. Public Administration and Safety □ □ 
p. Education and Training □ □ 
q. Health Care and Social Assistance □ □ 
r. Arts and Recreation Services □ □ 






7. How much information does head office have compared to subsidiary personnel concerning the following 
factors?  




a. Type of activities undertaken by subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Operational processes performed by subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Realisation of subsidiary performance potential  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Impact of external factors on subsidiary performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 







8. Indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements from the perspective of head office: 




a. Subsidiary goals are clearly defined □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Subsidiary goals provide clear direction to subsidiary personnel □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Subsidiary goals are easily explained to outsiders (e.g. customers) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Subsidiary goals are clear to everyone working in subsidiary  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
9. Head office can predict developments which affect subsidiary operations in the region the subsidiary is 
located according to the following factors: 




a. Supplier actions □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Customer demands, tastes and preferences □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Deregulation and globalisation □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Market activities of competitors □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Production and information technologies □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Government regulation and policies □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g. Economic environment □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
h. Industrial relations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
10. The following foreign subsidiary resources can be reallocated to alternative activities (for example, other 
subsidiaries or transferred back to head office) if subsidiary operations ceased: 




a. Skilled employees □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Training programs  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Physical assets (e.g. manufacturing and processing equipment) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Technological systems □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Product customisation expertise □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Branding rights □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g. Reputational capital  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
  





























11. Indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:  




a. The core area of business of both your subsidiary and your company’s 
global operations are related 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. All the activities of your company’s global operations are related □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4  □ 5 
c. Your company’s operations are involved in one line of business  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Personnel from head office visit the subsidiary frequently □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Subsidiary operations focus on a distinct activity □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4  □ 5 
f. Focus of subsidiary operations is difficult to change □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4  □ 5 
g. There is frequent communication between head office and subsidiary 
personnel concerning subsidiary operations 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4  □ 5 
 
 
12. The following factors are important to the competitiveness of the subsidiary relative to other companies in the 
region it operates: 




a. Operational efficiency □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Competitive pricing □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Procurement of product inputs □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Reducing production costs □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Minimisation of outside financing □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. New product development □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g. Brand identification □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
h. Innovative marketing techniques □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
i. Control of distribution channels □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
j. Advertising □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
13. The practices of subsidiary operations have changed or adapted over time due to relations with the following 
stakeholders:  




a. Customers □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Suppliers □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Government organisations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Professional trade associations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Entities within your company (e.g. other subsidiaries) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
  
   
14. Head office does the following concerning subsidiary operations: 




a. Specifies subsidiary personnel’s area of responsibility □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Sets guidelines specifying activities that are not to be engaged in □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Modifies targets in line with conditions subsidiary faces □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Uses documentation and manuals to direct subsidiary operations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Conducts extensive training concerning compliances with policies  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Subjectively evaluates subsidiary performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
15. Head office relies on internal audits to check subsidiary compliance with: 




a. Policies and procedures □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 






16. The following budget roles for the foreign subsidiary are important:  




a. Specifies performance targets subsidiary required to achieve  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Provide guidance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 




17. Performance targets concerning foreign subsidiary operations are established in the following ways: 




a. Set at the beginning of the period □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 




18. When performance does not meet expectations head office intervenes in the activities of subsidiary 
management in the following ways: 




a. Area of responsibility of subsidiary management changed □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Decision making delegated to subsidiary management changed □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Greater discussions between head office and subsidiary management 
concerning subsidiary operations 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 




19. Indicate the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements at the subsidiary level: 




a. Promotion of subsidiary personnel is linked to subsidiary performance  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Violating policies set by head office has serious consequences for 
subsidiary personnel 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Violating guidelines set by head office specifying activities not be 
engaged in has serious consequences for subsidiary personnel 




20. Head office is involved in the recruitment and training of subsidiary personnel in the following ways:  




a. Selection of personnel determined by head office □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Subsidiary management are trained by head office before they 
commence in their roles at the subsidiary 
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Ongoing training of personnel is provided by head office □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 




21. The following are used by head office to influence subsidiary personnel behaviour:  




a. Communication of corporate values □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Communication of codes of conduct □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 








22. Indicate whether head office and/or subsidiary management is responsible for the decision making process in the 
following areas: 




a. Long-term planning concerning subsidiary operations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Special business cases undertaken by subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Tasks performed by subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Standard operating procedures/work instructions for subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Guidelines and policies guiding subsidiary operations □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Target setting for subsidiary □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g. Evaluation of subsidiary performance  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 






23. Indicate the degree of similarity between the subsidiary and all other entities owned by your company concerning 
practices in the following areas: 
  Very high  Not at all 
a. Human resources □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Training programs □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Information system □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Purchase and ordering system □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Reporting system □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
24. What importance does head office place on the following targets concerning subsidiary operations? 
  Very high  Not at all 
a. Return targets (e.g. return on investment/assets) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Profit targets (e.g. net profit, gross profit) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Sales targets □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Cash flow targets □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Customer targets (e.g. market share, customer satisfaction) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Internal process targets (e.g. processing time, efficiency ratings) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g. Learning targets (e.g. employee development, R&D outcomes) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
h. Market benchmarks □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
i. Internal benchmarks  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
25. What importance does head office place on the following when monitoring subsidiary performance? 
  Very high  Not at all 
a. Achievement of performance target(s) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Variance between budget and actual performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Market benchmarks versus actual performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Line items in financial accounts (e.g. revenues, expenses, profit) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 





        Answer question 22 using the scale below: (tick one box for each row) 
 
 




































26. What importance does head office place on the following when evaluating subsidiary performance? 
  Very high  Not at all 
a. Achievement of performance target(s) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Variance between budget versus actual performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Market benchmarks versus actual performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Compliance with policies and procedures □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Professional development of managers □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Long-term sustained performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
g Contribution to overall performance of your company  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
 
 
27. What importance does head office place on the following when rewarding subsidiary management? 
  Very high  Not at all 
a. Achievement of performance target(s) □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
b. Variance between budget and actual performance  □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
c. Market benchmarks versus actual performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
d. Long-term performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
e. Subsidiary specific performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 
f. Corporation wide performance □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 





28. Indicate the satisfaction of head office with the performance of the wholly owned foreign subsidiary according to 
the following factors (Please tick one box for each row):  
















a. Profitability □ □ □ □ □ □ 
b. Sales volume □ □ □ □ □ □ 
c. Market share □ □ □ □ □ □ 
d. Productivity □ □ □ □ □ □ 
e. Adapting to a foreign market □ □ □ □ □ □ 
f. Ability to adopt innovation □ □ □ □ □ □ 
g. Learning about unfamiliar market □ □ □ □ □ □ 
h. Learning about new technology □ □ □ □ □ □ 
i. Product quality □ □ □ □ □ □ 
j. Customer satisfaction □ □ □ □ □ □ 
k.  Corporate citizenship □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
29. In general, how satisfied is head office with the overall performance of the wholly owned foreign subsidiary? 
Extremely satisfied Satisfied Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied Extremely dissatisfied 




Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance is 
very much appreciated. 
  








Table B.1 - Indicators of control archetypes 











1 Accountability/responsibilities defined 14a         
2 Autonomy extended to subsidiary management 22a-e   (reversed)   
3 HQ management by exception 18a-d         
4 Transparency of information flow (between HQ 
and subsidiary) 
11g 
        
Standardisation 
Action 
5 Boundaries delineated  14b          
6 Codification of actions (rules & instructions) 14d,e          
7 Standardised systems 23a-e          
Targets 
8 Codification of targets (internally determined) (24a-g, 24i, 16a, 17a)          
9 Flexibility of targets 22f, 14c   (reversed)      
10 Broad HQ performance expectations 16b         
11 Emergent HQ performance expectations 17b         
12 Set limits on activities  16c          
Monitoring & performance 
evaluation 
13 Adherence to codified actions (policies and 
procedures) monitored 
15a, 26d 
         
14 Monitoring & evaluation based on codified targets 25a-b,d, 11d, 26a-b          
15 Monitoring & evaluation according to market 
benchmarks 
24h, 25c, 26c 
         
16 Long-term performance assessment 26e, 26f-g         
17 Subjectivity in performance evaluation 22g, 14f         
18 HQ periodically checking compliance with 
boundaries 
15b, 26d 
         
Rewards 
19 Punishment for not complying with codified 
actions 
19b 
         
20 Rewards based on codified evaluation 27a-b          
21 Rewards tied to market based performance 
evaluation 
27c 
         
22 Reward through promotion 27d, 19a         
23 Subjectivity in reward determination 27e, 22h         




Appendix C – Variable measurement validity 





Arm’s length control*  
Monitoring & evaluation according to market benchmarks (MCI 15) 0.923 
Rewards tied to market based performance evaluation (MCI 21) 0.923 
  
Results oriented machine control*  
Codifications of targets (MCI 8) 0.766 
Monitoring & evaluation based on codified targets (MCI 14) 0.883 
Rewards based on codified evaluation (MCI 20) 0.847 
  
Action oriented machine control*  
Codification of actions (MCI 6) 0.776 
Adherence to codified actions (MCI 13) 0.845 
Punishment for not complying with codified actions (MCI 19) 0.755 
  
Boundary control*  
Boundaries delineated (MCI 5) 0.806 
HQ periodically checking compliance with boundaries (MCI 18) 0.768 
Severe sanctions for crossing boundaries (MCI 24) 0.769 
  
Exploratory control*  
Transparency of information flow (MCI 4) 0.680 
Flexibility of targets (MCI 9) 0.712 
Broad HQ performance expectations (MCI 10) 0.673 
Subjectivity in performance evaluation (MCI 17) 0.601 
  
Corporate strategy^  
Relatedness of subsidiary core business to company’s global operations (11a) 0.831 
Relatedness of company’s global operations (11b) 0.906 
Company operations involved in one line of business (11c) 0.744 
  
Degree of control  
Arm’s length control 0.528 
Results oriented machine control 0.675 
Action oriented machine control 0.865 
Boundary control 0.866 
Exploratory control 0.727 
  
Low cost competitive strategy^  
Operational efficiency (12a) 0.715 
Procurement of product inputs (12c) 0.816 
Reducing production costs (12d) 0.891 
  
Differentiation competitive strategy^  
New product development (12f) 0.643 
Brand identification (12g) 0.813 
Innovative marketing techniques (12h) 0.870 
Control of distribution channels (12i) 0.778 
Advertising (12j) 0.830 
  
External embeddedness^  
Suppliers (13b) 0.722 
Government organisations (13c) 0.731 
Professional trade associations (13d) 0.798 
*Refer to Table B.1 (Appendix B) for the survey questions applied at the basis of the control archetype 
indicators 
^Refer to Appendix A for the survey instrument relating to the indicators  
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Table C.2 – Construct composite reliability 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha 
Arm’s length control 0.826 
Results oriented machine control 0.775 
Action oriented machine control 0.701 
Boundary control 0.678 
Exploratory control 0.584 
Degree of control 0.759 
Corporate strategy 0.695 
Low cost competitive strategy 0.735 
Differentiation competitive strategy 0.846 





























Arm’s length control 0.923          
Results control 0.383** 0.833         
Action control 0.303*** 0.407*** 0.793        
Boundary control 0.308*** 0.407*** 0.813*** 0.781       
Exploratory control 0.132* 0.455*** 0.531*** 0.551*** 0.668      
Corporate strategy –0.057 –0.107 –0.095 –0.120 –0.259*** 0.688     
Low cost competitive strategy 0.270*** 0.207*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.192** –0.068 0.657    
Differentiation competitive strategy 0.345*** 0.160** 0.075 0.078 0.061 –0.007 0.238*** 0.625   
Corporate embeddedness 0.155* 0.259*** 0.184** 0.189** 0.012 0.063 0.017 0.040 1.000  
External embeddedness 0.230*** 0.203** 0.253*** 0.116 0.129 –0.016 0.150* 0.147 0.250*** 0.564 
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Table 1 – Company positions of survey respondents 
Position Frequency Percentage 
Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director 75 47.2 
General Manager 17 10.7 
Financial Controller 16 10.1 
Chief Financial Officer 14 8.8 
Executive Director 13 8.2 
Chairman 6 3.8 
Company Secretary 6 3.8 
Finance Manager 5 3.1 
Chief Operating Officer 3 1.9 
Group Accounting Manager 2 1.3 
Other 2 1.3 




Table 2 – Respondent characteristics 
Panel A – Industry classification of sample firms 
Industry Corporation Subsidiary 
Frequency* Percentage Frequency* Percentage 
Mining 46 20.4 37 18.5 
Manufacturing 38 16.8 27 13.5 
Other Services 26 11.5 26 13.0 
Professional, Scientific & Technical 
Services 18 8.0 19 9.5 
Information Media & 
Telecommunications 16 7.1 15 7.5 
Finance & Insurance Services 13 5.8 12 6.0 
Wholesale Trade 13 5.8 16 8.0 
Construction 11 4.9 10 5.0 
Electricity, Gas, Water & Waste Services 8 3.5 8 4.0 
Retail Trade 7 3.1 5 2.5 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 6 2.7 5 2.5 
Health Care & Social Assistance 6 2.7 6 3.0 
Transport, Postal & Warehousing 6 2.7 4 2.0 
Administrative & Support Services 5 2.2 4 2.0 
Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 3 1.3 4 2.0 
Accommodation & Food Services 1 0.4 0 0.0 
Arts & Recreation Services 1 0.4 1 0.5 
Education & Training 1 0.4 1 0.5 
Public Administration & Safety 1 0.4 0 0.0 
*Total frequency higher than sample size (159) due to some firms indicating involvement in multiple 
industries. 
 
Panel B – Subsidiary location 
Region Frequency Percentage 
North America 42 26.4 
Asia 34 21.4 
Oceania 34 21.4 
Europe 27 17.0 
Africa 16 10.1 
Middle East 4 2.5 




Table 3 – Descriptive statistics^ 
 Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Arm’s length control 1.000 5.000 2.962 3.000 0.992 
Results control 2.097 5.000 4.150 4.181 0.560 
Action control 1.500 5.000 3.560 3.667 0.785 
Boundary control 2.000 5.000 3.829 3.833 0.709 
Exploratory control 2.250 5.000 4.129 4.000 0.485 
Degree of control 2.267 4.900 3.733 3.767 0.519 
Corporate strategy 1.000 4.667 1.732 1.667 0.797 
Low cost competitive strategy 2.000 5.000 3.782 4.000 0.753 
Differentiation competitive strategy 1.000 5.000 3.369 3.400 0.844 
Corporate embeddedness 1.000 5.000 3.195 3.000 0.997 
External embeddedness  1.000 5.000 3.082 3.000 0.742 
Size (employees) 5.000 38,000.000 1989.138 180.000 5848.405 
^ The statistics reported in this table are based on the non-normalised variables. Where appropriate the variables 
are normalised, consistent with the assumptions of OLS regression. 
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Table 4 – Regression results 
Control  Predicted 
sign 
Degree of control Arm’s length Results Action Boundary Exploratory 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
Corporate strategy – –0.216*** –3.030 –0.071 –0.937 –0.222*** –3.045 –0.147* –1.934 –0.164** –2.134 –0.270*** –3.411 
Low cost competitive strategy + 0.268*** 3.727 0.158** 2.083 0.096 1.308 0.249*** 3.243 0.277*** 3.573 0.150* 1.875 
Differentiation competitive strategy – 0.138* 1.918 0.284*** 3.737 0.082 1.118 –0.003 –0.035 0.031 0.398 0.065 0.812 
Corporate embeddedness + 0.191** 2.627 0.089 1.160 0.217*** 2.911 0.171** 2.199 0.205*** 2.620 0.014 0.170 
External embeddedness – 0.122* 1.670 0.134* 1.725 0.122 1.617 0.135* 1.719 –0.019 –0.242 0.044 0.536 
Size  0.193*** 2.690 0.082 1.087 0.323*** 4.399 0.164** 2.139 0.122 1.578 0.088 1.106 
Adjusted R square  0.260 0.172 0.222 0.155 0.138 0.084 
F-stat (significance)  10.246*** (0.000) 6.452*** (0.000) 8.515*** (0.000) 5.825*** (0.000) 5.198*** (0.000) 3.416*** (0.003) 









Table 5 – Multinominal logistic regression 
Panel A – Control archetype choice relative to arm’s length control 
Independent variable Results control  Action control  Boundary control  Exploratory control 
 Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald 
Corporate strategy 0.065 0.009  –0.039 0.002  –0.496 0.441  –0.617 0.743 
Low cost competitive strategy –2.519** 5.849  –2.553** 4.291  –1.916* 3.262  –2.565** 6.057 
Differentiation competitive strategy –0.960 1.853  –0.685 0.600  –0.765 1.087  –1.032 2.148 
Corporate embeddedness 0.303 0.327  –0.547 0.541  0.622 1.230  0.380 0.508 
External embeddedness –0.303 0.134  1.364 1.266  –1.066 1.550  –0.742 0.806 
Size 0.000 0.674  0.000 0.074  0.000 0.770  0.000 0.307 
Intercept 15.878*** 6.164  10.322 1.918  14.132** 4.697  18.492*** 8.316 
            
% Correctly classified Arm’s length control: 4.4%; Results control: 40.7%; Action control: 4.4%; 
Boundary control: 14.8%; Exploratory control: 35.6% 
  
Model chi-square 41.969** (24 d.f.)        
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level (two tailed) 
Panel B – Control archetype choice relative to results control 
Independent variable Arm’s length control  Action control  Boundary control  Exploratory control 
 Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald 
Corporate strategy –0.065 0.009  –0.104 0.027  –0.561 2.295  –0.682** 5.615 
Low cost competitive strategy 2.519** 5.849  –0.034 0.002  0.603 2.482  –0.046 0.025 
Differentiation competitive strategy 0.960 1.853  0.275 0.199  0.194 0.290  –0.072 0.073 
Corporate embeddedness –0.303 0.327  –0.850* 2.193  0.319 1.178  0.077 0.120 
External embeddedness 0.303 0.134  1.668* 3.109  –0.762* 3.556  –0.439 1.932 
Size 0.000 0.674  0.000 0.773  0.000 0.171  0.000 1.032 
Intercept –15.878** 6.164  –5.556 1.770  –1.746 0.607  2.614 2.571 
            
% Correctly classified Arm’s length control: 4.4%; Results control: 40.7%; Action control: 4.4%; 
Boundary control: 14.8%; Exploratory control: 35.6% 
  
Model chi-square 41.969** (24 d.f.)        
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level (two tailed) 
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Panel C – Control archetype choice relative to action control  
Independent variable Arm’s length control  Results control  Boundary control  Exploratory control 
 Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald 
Corporate strategy 0.039 0.002  0.104 0.027  –0.457 0.421  –0.579 0.768 
Low cost competitive strategy 2.553** 4.291  0.034 0.002  0.636 0.653  –0.012 0.000 
Differentiation competitive strategy 0.685 0.600  –0.275 0.199  –0.081 0.014  –0.347 0.314 
Corporate embeddedness 0.547 0.541  0.850 2.193  1.169* 3.638  0.927 2.578 
External embeddedness –1.364 1.266  –1.668* 3.109  –2.430** 6.030  –2.106** 4.899 
Size 0.000 0.074  0.000 0.773  0.000 0.842  0.000 0.489 
Intercept –10.322 1.918  5.556 1.770  3.810 0.711  8.170* 3.751 
            
% Correctly classified Arm’s length control: 4.4%; Results control: 40.7%; Action control: 4.4%; 
Boundary control: 14.8%; Exploratory control: 35.6% 
  
Model chi-square 41.969** (24 d.f.)        
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level (two tailed) 
Panel D – Control archetype choice relative to boundary control 
Independent variable Arm’s length control  Results control  Action control  Exploratory control 
 Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald  Coefficient Wald 
Corporate strategy 0.496 0.441  0.561 2.295  0.457 0.421  –0.121 0.092 
Low cost competitive strategy 1.916* 3.262  –0.603 2.482  –0.636 0.653  –0.649* 2.906 
Differentiation competitive strategy 0.765 1.087  –0.194 0.290  0.081 0.014  –0.266 0.559 
Corporate embeddedness –0.622 1.230  –0.319 1.178  –1.169* 3.638  –0.242 0.680 
External embeddedness 1.066 1.550  0.762* 3.556  2.430** 6.030  0.323 0.699 
Size 0.000 0.770  0.000 0.171  0.000 0.842  0.000 1.390 
Intercept –14.132** 4.697  1.746 0.607  –3.810 0.711  4.360* 3.805 
            
% Correctly classified Arm’s length control: 4.4%; Results control: 40.7%; Action control: 4.4%; 
Boundary control: 14.8%; Exploratory control: 35.6% 
  
Model chi-square 41.969** (24 d.f.)        
***Significant at the 0.01 level; **Significant at the 0.05 level; *Significant at the 0.10 level (two tailed) 
 
